A surprising contact on the professional network. An offer of work from a recruiter, most likely a young woman, operating from China. The chance to make around £20,000 on the side preparing a handful of political reports for a firm from China peppered with confidential or privileged insights. Compensation in cryptocurrency or physical money preferred.
It might appear obvious, on this telling, that something about this approach would be amiss. However, Beijing's influential Ministry of State Security still considers it valuable to deploy headhunters to attempt this – prompting MI5 to warn repeatedly about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Approaches on Social Media
Last year, MI5 chief Ken McCallum stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on the platform on an extraordinary scale, at a rate of 10,000 over the previous 30-month period, seeking political, industrial, military and technological classified information. But a new campaign targeting elected officials and Westminster has led the spy agency to act again.
A spying alert was distributed on this week via the offices of Lindsay Hoyle and his House of Lords equivalent: a single slide after the repeated efforts of Shirly Shen and Amanda Qiu to reach out to MPs, lords, their assistants, economists, research organizations – anyone who might provide information.
Intelligence Approach and Legislative Changes
In the typical style of British intelligence, there was no official release of the security advice from MI5 or the Home Office. But the agency knew its advisory document would become public once it was sent electronically out to Westminster. Republishing it in the media assists the wider public more easily recognize communications with a deceptive intent.
This warning has the impact of uncovering more information from within Westminster, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The service wants people in public life to recognize that just because exchanges on LinkedIn are less overtly risky as on X or Facebook, it doesn't imply they are completely safe.
Additionally, the internal security service understood to have been reacting to any specific incident in parliament, although the recent actions does come after the awkward failure of the legal case of a ex-assistant an individual and his associate Christopher Berry on a technicality in recent months.
Both individuals had been accused of working for the foreign power – a allegation they rejected – but inability to complete a prosecution under the now repealed previous legislation led to warnings that the UK's political system had been insufficiently defended.
Revised Legislation and China's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the security briefing contains a note of its replacement: “Individuals involved in spying operations face substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” This constitutes a crime if somebody engages in behavior that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, however, is what Beijing has to gain. An elected representative who is outside ministerial roles will have restricted knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs less so. But Beijing is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as the telecom firm or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being driven by parliamentarians.
Cultural Variations and Persistent Cyber Threats
In part there are cultural differences as well. Autocratic regimes like Beijing's export information gathering methods and the size of its spy network is enormous, engaging 300,000 people. Chris Inglis, a US national cyber director under the US administration, said it was sometimes estimated that “China have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have personnel with language skills”.
The Chinese government is prepared to develop people over the extended period and sometimes even the intelligence services have found it difficult to differentiate legitimate relationships and espionage. “Beijing has a low threshold for what information is deemed to be of value,” security minister a government official told MPs on this week, but a sudden turn in the government situation may mean someone quickly peripheral becomes important.
An alternative perspective to consider the relentless efforts at covert intelligence collection is in the wider context of the international competition between Beijing and the Western nations at a level below the point of direct conflict. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the Salt Typhoon infiltration of phone and data networks in numerous nations, and the Volt Typhoon compromise of countless internet devices.
Beijing is involved in relentless attempts to find secret informants on British democracy online because it seeks to be provocative, to demonstrate influence and because it can.
